A logic-enriched type theory (LTT) is a type theory extended with a primitive mechanism for forming and proving propositions. We construct two LTTs, named LTT 0 and LTT * 0 , which we claim correspond closely to the classical predicative systems of second order arithmetic ACA 0 and ACA. We justify this claim by translating each second-order system into the corresponding LTT, and proving that these translations are conservative. This is part of an ongoing research project to investigate how LTTs may be used to formalise different approaches to the foundations of mathematics.
Introduction
A lot of research in the field of mathematical logic has been devoted to constructing formal theories intended to capture various schools of thought in the 6 This research was supported by the UK EPSRC research grant EP/D066638/1 and research grant F/07-537/AA of the Leverhulme Trust in the UK. foundations of mathematics. In particular, the project of Reverse Mathematics [1] has provided an extremely detailed analysis of many theories in the language of second-order arithmetic L. It has been argued that the theories studied correspond closely to different foundational schools; in particular, that the classical, predicative foundation presented by Hermann Weyl in his monograph Das Kontinuum [2] is captured by the theory ACA 0 [3] .
The systems of logic known as dependent type theories have also received a lot of attention, and in particular have proven to offer many practical benefits when used as the basis of the computer systems known as proof checkers or proof assistants. Type theories divide the world of mathematical objects into types. They offer much more expressive power than second-order arithmetic: we are able to speak, not just of natural numbers and sets of natural numbers, but also about (e.g.) sets of sets, lists, trees, and functions from any of these types to any of them. However, so far, type theories have been used almost exclusively to represent constructive mathematics.
More recently, the concept of a logic-enriched type theory has been developed. A logic-enriched type theory is a type theory augmented with a separate, primitive mechanism for forming and proving propositions. It thus has two components or 'worlds': a type-theoretic component, consisting of objects collected into types, and a logical component, for reasoning about these objects. LTTs have been used to investigate the relationships between type theories and set theories [4, 5] , and by the present authors [6, 7] to formalise the predicative foundation for mathematics presented by Hermann Weyl in Das Kontinuum [2] .
There is reason to believe that LTTs may offer some of the advantages of both traditional logical systems, and type theories. They share with type theories the rich type structure and inbuilt notion of computation that have proven to be of great benefit for formalisation in practice. At the same time, they offer the flexibility in choice of axioms that we are used to in traditional logical systems: it is possible, for example, to add excluded middle to the logical component without changing the type-theoretic component. This paper is part of an ongoing research project to construct a hierarchy of LTTs, similar to the hierarchy of second-order systems in Reverse Mathematics. We hope thereby to investigate how LTTs may be used to represent different schools of thought in the foundations of mathematics, and to understand the effect that changes in the design of an LTT have on its set of definable objects and provable theorems.
In this paper, we construct two LTTs that capture two second-order systems that are closely related to the foundation of Das Kontinuum: ACA 0 and ACA. We construct two LTTs, which we name LTT 0 and LTT * 0 . These are more expressive than a second-order system: the type-theoretic component of each features types of natural numbers, pairs, functions of all orders, and sets of all orders.
Our aim in this paper is to show that adding this expressive power is 'safe'; that is, that we have not thereby increased the proof-theoretic strength of the system. We do this as follows. Let us say that a proposition of LTT 0 is secondorder iff it uses no types other than N (the type of natural numbers) and Set (N) (the type of sets of natural numbers). We define a translation from ACA 0 onto the second-order propositions of LTT 0 , and prove that the translation is conservative; that is, a formula of L is provable in ACA 0 if and only if its translation is provable in LTT 0 .
The current authors have previously [6, 7] presented a new system intended to capture Weyl's foundation, which we named LTT W . We argued there that LTT W captures Weyl's foundation very closely, and described how all the definitions and results in Das Kontinuum have been formalised in LTT W using a proof assistant. The two LTTs that we construct in this paper are both subsystems of LTT W . As a consequence of the work in this paper, we now know that LTT W is strictly stronger than ACA 0 , and at least as strong as ACA.
We argue that, compared with ACA 0 and ACA, LTT W corresponds more closely to the system presented in Das Kontinuum. This is not a claim that can be proven formally, as there is no formal definition of Weyl's foundation, but we can advance evidence for it. In our previous paper, we pointed out the extreme similarity between the presentation in Das Kontinuum and the definition of LTT W , and described one construction in Das Kontinuum -the construction of K(n) = {X | X has at least n elements} -that cannot be done 'as directly' in any of the second order systems. Here, we strengthen the justification for this claim: we show that K is expressed by a term in LTT W that cannot be formed in either LTT 0 or LTT * 0 . The majority of this paper is taken up with proving the conservativity results. Our method for proving the conservativity of LTT 0 over ACA 0 is as follows. We first define a subsystem T 2 of LTT 0 which has just two types, N and Set (N). and show that LTT 0 is conservative over T 2 .
We then construct infinitely many subsystems of LTT 0 between T 2 and LTT 0 . We prove that, for each of these subsystems S and T , whenever S is a subsystem of T , then T is conservative over S. We do this by defining an interpretation of the judgements of T in terms of the expressions of S. Informally, we can think of this as giving a way of reading the judgements of T as statements about S. We show that this interpretation satisfies two properties:
• Every derivable judgement of T is true.
• Every judgement of S that is true is derivable in S.
It follows that, if a judgement of S is derivable in T , then it is derivable in S.
The proof thus makes use of an original technique which should be of interest in its own right, and which we expect to be applicable in a wide variety of contexts for proving one LTT or type theory conservative over another. In particular, we shall show how it can be adapted to provide a direct proof that ACA 0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic.
Outline
In Section 2 of this paper, we describe the subsystems of second order arithmetic that we shall consider, and compare them informally with Weyl's system. In Section 3, we give the formal definition of LTT W and its two subsystems, and define the translation from second order arithmetic into the LTTs. In Section 4, we prove that this translation is conservative in the case of ACA 0 and T 2 . In Section 5, we prove that LTT 0 is conservative over T 2 . Finally, in Section 6, we indicate how the proof can be modified to prove the conservativity of LTT * 0 over ACA, and discuss the possibility of constructing a subsystem of LTT W conservative over ACA + 0 , and the conservativity of ACA 0 over Peano Arithmetic.
Notation. We shall stick to the following convention throughout this paper. Capital letters from the beginning of the Latin alphabet (A, B, C, . . . ) shall denote types. Capital letters from the middle (K, L, M , N , . . . ) shall denote terms. Capital letters from just after the middle (P , Q) shall denote names of small propositions. Lower-case letters (x, y, z, . . . ) shall denote variables, except t, which we reserve for terms of the language of second-order arithmetic. Lower-case letters from the middle of the Greek alphabet (φ, ψ, χ, . . . ) shall denote propositions.
We shall be dealing with partial functions throughout this paper. We write X ≃ Y to denote that the expression X is defined if and only if Y is defined, in which case they are equal. Given a function v, we write v[x := a] for the function v ′ with domain dom v ∪ {x}, such that v ′ (x) = a, and v ′ (y) = v(y) for y = x. We write FV (X) for the set of free variables in the expression X.
Background

Weyl's Das Kontinuum
In 1918, Herman Weyl wrote the monograph Das Kontinuum [2] , which presented a semi-formal system intended to provide a predicative foundation for mathematics. Weyl's system consists of a set of 'principles' by which sets, functions and propositions may be introduced. In particular, if we have formed the proposition φ, we may introduce the set {x | φ}, provided that φ does not involve any quantification over sets. Impredicative definitions are thus impossible in Weyl's system. His concern was to show how much of mathematics -in particular, how much of analysis -could still be retained under such a restriction.
At the time of writing Das Kontinuum in 1918, Weyl agreed with Whitehead and Russell's opinion [8] that the source of the famous paradoxes in set theory was the presence of impredicative definitions -definitions that involved a certain kind of vicious circle. In particular, when we introduce a set R with the definition R = {x | φ}
then the definition is impredicative if either x or any of the bound variables in φ ranges over a collection that includes the set R itself. In Weyl's foundation, mathematical objects are divided into categories. A category can be basic or ideal. Given any category A, there is the ideal category Set (A) 1 of sets whose members are objects of category A. In a definition of the form (1), we may only quantify over basic categories. In particular, we may not quantify over any category of the form Set (A). It is in this manner that impredicative definitions are excluded.
If we bar impredicative definitions, we are unable to define many objects, such as the least upper bound of a bounded set of reals. We must thus either find an alternative way to introduce these objects, or do without them. Russell and Whitehead chose the former course, with their Axiom of Reducibility. The monograph Das Kontinuum was Weyl's attempt to follow the latter course: to show how much of classical mathematics could be preserved while excluding impredicative definitions.
Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic
We are concerned in this paper with two subsystems of second order arithmetic, ACA 0 and ACA. The letters ACA stand for 'arithmetical comprehension axiom'. The system ACA 0 is investigated in great detail in Simpson [1] . These two systems are theories in the language of second order arithmetic, a language for describing natural numbers and sets of natural numbers. We now introduce this language formally. Definition 2.1 (Language of Second Order Arithmetic). The language of second order arithmetic L is defined as follows.
There are two countably infinite, disjoint sets of variables: the number variables x, y, z, . . . , intended to range over natural numbers; and the set variables X, Y , Z, . . . , intended to range over sets of natural numbers.
The terms and propositions of second order arithmetic are given by the following grammar:
We define ¬, ∧, ∨, ↔ and ∃ in terms of ⊥, ⊃ and ∀ as usual.
A proposition is arithmetic iff no set quantifier ∀X occurs within it.
ACA 0
The system ACA 0 has been very well studied. In particular, it has played a major role in the project of Reverse Mathematics [1] . It has often been argued that ACA 0 is closely related to Weyl's foundation; for example, Feferman [3] calls it 'a modern formulation of Weyl's system', and Brown and Simpson [9] write 'ACA 0 isolates the same portion of mathematical practice which was identified as 'predicative analysis' by Herman Weyl in his famous monograph Das Kontinuum'.
It is known that ACA 0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic (PA); a modeltheoretic proof is given in Simpson [1] , and a proof-theoretic proof can be given along the lines of Shoenfield [10] . A novel proof of this result shall be given in Section 6.2.
The axioms of ACA 0 are as follows:
• The Peano axioms -the axioms of Peano Arithmetic, minus the induction axioms:
• The arithmetical comprehension axiom schema: for every arithmetic proposition φ in which X does not occur free, ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ φ).
• The set induction axiom: 0 ∈ X ⊃ ∀x(x ∈ X ⊃ Sx ∈ X) ⊃ ∀x.x ∈ X.
ACA
The system ACA is formed by extending ACA 0 with the full induction axiom schema: for every proposition φ,
An argument could be made for ACA being a better representation of the foundation in Das Kontinuum than ACA 0 , because -as we shall argue in Section 2.3 -Weyl makes use of an induction principle that is stronger than that of ACA 0 .
The system ACA has not been studied in the literature as much as ACA 0 . A few facts about ACA are known: its proof-theoretic ordinal is ε ε0 , and it can prove the consistency of ACA 0 . See [11] for the proof of these results and an analysis of the set of models of ACA.
Das Kontinuum and Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic Compared
There has been quite some argument over how well Weyl's foundation is captured by a subsystem of second order arithmetic. Feferman [12] has argued strongly in favour of ACA 0 , or a system very like it, being a modern formulation of Weyl's system. This argument cannot be settled formally, as Weyl did not give a formal definition of his system. However, in the authors' view, Weyl's system exceeds both ACA 0 and ACA, for the following reasons:
1. Weyl intended his system to be more than second order. He allowed the category Set (B) to be formed for any category B, basic or ideal. Thus, for example, we can form the categories Set (Set (N)), Set (Set (Set (N))), and so forth.
2. Weyl intended the principle of induction to apply to all propositions, arithmetic or not.
We justify this by showing a place where Weyl explicitly defines a function of category Set (Set (A)) → Set (Set (A)), and three places where he proves a non-arithmetic proposition by induction. The former occurs [13, p.39] with the definition of the cardinality of a set. Weyl defines a function d : Set (Set (A)) → Set (Set (A)) by
This function is then iterated, to form the function d n (T ) = {X | n elements may be removed from X to form an element of T }.
Weyl goes on to argue that d n (U ) denotes the set of all sets with at least n elements (where U is the set of all subsets of A). He defines the proposition a(n, X), 'X has at least n elements', by
Various results about this definition are later proved [13, p.55 ], such as:
If X has at least n + 1 elements, then X has at least n elements. This is not an arithmetic proposition (it involves quantification over X), but it is proven by induction on n. Similarly, the non-arithmetic proposition 'If X is a subset of E and X consists of at least n elements, then E also consists of at least n elements' [13, p.56] is proven by induction, as is the lemma concerning substitution of elements [13, p.56 ]: 'If a new object [. . . ] is substituted for one of the elements of a set X which consists of at least n elements [. . . ], then the modified set X * also consists of at least n elements. ' Thus, Weyl's method of defining a(n, X) involves third-order sets; the application of the Principle of Iteration to third-order sets; and proof by induction of a proposition that quantifies over sets. These are all expressed by primitive constructs in LTT W , but not in LTT 0 or LTT
Logic-Enriched Type Theories
In this section, we introduce the logic-enriched type theory LTT W and the two subsystems with which we are concerned.
Logic-enriched type theories (LTTs) were introduced by Aczel and Gambino [4, 5] to study the relationship between type theories and set theories. An LTT is a formal system consisting of two parts: the type-theory component, which deals with terms and types; and the logical component, which deals with propositions.
LTT W
The system LTT W is a logic-enriched type theory designed to represent the mathematical foundation given in Das Kontinuum. It was introduced in Adams and Luo [7, 6] .
Type-Theoretic Component
Its type-theoretic component has the following types.
• There is a type N of natural numbers. 0 is a natural number; and, for any natural number N , the successor of N , s N , is a natural number.
• For any types A and B, we may form the type A × B. • For any type A, we may form the type Set (A) of sets of terms of A. Its terms have the form {x : A | P }, where P is a name of a small proposition, denoting the set of all M : A for which the proposition named by [M/x]P is true.
We divide the types into small and large types, reflecting Weyl's division of categories into basic and ideal categories. When we introduce a set {x : A | P }, the proposition P may quantify over the small types, but not over the large types. The small types are defined inductively by:
• N is a small type.
• If A and B are small types, then A × B is a small type.
We effect this division by introducing a type universe U , whose terms are names of the small types. There is a termN : U which is the name of N; and, if M : U names A and N : U names B, then there is a term M×N : U that names A × B. We write T (M ) for the type named by M .
We can also eliminate N over any family of types; that is, if A[x] is a type depending on x : N, we can define by recursion a function f such that f (x) :
is intended to denote the value f (N ), where f is the function defined by recursion thus:
Remark. We choose to label the terms
with the types A and B. This is for technical reasons only; it makes the interpretations we introduce in Section 5 easier to define. We shall often omit these labels when writing terms. We shall also often write M N for M (N ).
Logical Component
The logical component of LTT W contains propositions built up as follows:
• If M and N are objects of the small type
• ⊥ is a proposition.
• If φ and ψ are propositions, then φ ⊃ ψ is a proposition.
• If A is a type and φ a proposition, then ∀x : A.φ is a proposition.
We define the other logical connectives as follows:
We call a proposition φ small iff, for every quantifier ∀x : A that occurs in φ, the type A is a small type. We wish it to be the case that, when we introduce a set of type Set (A), the proposition we use to do so must be a small proposition. We achieve this by introducing a propositional universe 'prop', which will be the collection of names of the small propositions. We shall introduce a new judgement form Γ ⊢ P prop, denoting that P is the name of a small proposition, and rules that guarantee:
•⊥ is the name of ⊥.
• If P names φ and Q names ψ, then P⊃Q is the name of φ ⊃ ψ.
• If M : U names the small type A and P names φ, then∀x : M.P names ∀x : A.φ.
We denote by V (P ) the small proposition named by P . We shall, in the sequel, often write just 'small proposition' when we should strictly write 'name of small proposition'. We use 'expression' to mean a type, term, small proposition or proposition. We identify expressions up to α-conversion. We denote by [M/x]X the result of substituting the term M for the variable x in the expression X, avoiding variable capture.
Judgements and Rules of Deduction
A context in LTT W has the form x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , where the x i s are distinct variables and each A i is a type. There are ten judgement forms in LTT W :
• Γ ⊢ valid, denoting that Γ is a valid context.
• Γ ⊢ A type, denoting that A is a well-formed type under the context Γ.
• Γ ⊢ A = B, denoting that A and B are equal types.
• Γ ⊢ M : A, denoting that M is a term of type A.
• Γ ⊢ M = N : A, denoting that M and N are equal terms of type A.
• Γ ⊢ P prop, denoting that P is a well-formed name of a small proposition.
• Γ ⊢ P = Q, denoting that P and Q are equal names of small propositions.
• Γ ⊢ φ Prop, denoting that φ is a well-formed proposition.
• Γ ⊢ φ = ψ, denoting that φ and ψ are equal propositions.
• Γ ⊢ φ 1 , . . . , φ n ⇒ ψ, denoting that the propositions φ 1 , . . . , φ n entail the proposition ψ.
The rules of deduction of LTT W are given in full in Appendix Appendix A.1. They consist of the introduction, elimination and computation rules for the types of LTT W , the rules for classical predicate logic, and the following rule for performing induction over N:
We now construct two subsystems of LTT W , which we shall call LTT 0 and LTT
• the class of types over which N may be eliminated (that is, the class of types A that may occur in
• the class of propositions that may be proved by induction (that is, the class of propositions φ that may occur in an instance of (Ind N )).
In LTT W , we may eliminate N over any type, and any proposition may be proved by induction. We form our three subsystems by weakening these two classes, as shown in Table 1 This is achieved as follows.
Types over which
Propositions provable by induction N may be eliminated LTT W all all LTT 0 small types small propositions LTT * 0 small types propositions involving quantification over small types and Set (N ) •
• Whenever an instance of the rule (Ind N ) is used, the proposition φ must have the form V (P ).
• Whenever an instance of the rule (subst), (eta × ) or (eta → ) is used, the proposition φ must not contain a quantifier ∀x : A over any type A that contains the symbol U .
• We also add as an axiom that SM = 0 for M : N.
2. Let us say that a proposition φ is analytic iff, for every quantifier ∀x : A in φ, A either has the form T (M ) or A ≡ Set (N). We construct LTT * 0 from LTT 0 by allowing (Ind N ) to be used whenever φ is an analytic proposition.
The formal definitions of both these systems are given in Appendices Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3.
Remarks.
1. Peano's fourth axiom, that SM =N 0 for any M : N, is provable in LTT W ; see [6] for a proof. It is not provable in LTT 0 or LTT * 0 . This can be shown by a similar method to Smith [14] by constructing a model of LTT * 0 in which every small type is interpreted by a set that has exactly one element. 2. We can now justify further our claim in Section 2.3 that Weyl's definition of a(n, X) uses the primitive concepts of LTT W that are not present in either LTT 0 or LTT * 0 . The definitions of d and a are straightforward to formalise in LTT W . Given M : U , we have
This is not a term in either of the subsystems of LTT W , as it involves applying E N to the type Set (Set (T (M ))).
3. The universe U contains only the types that can be built up from N and ×. Its inclusion in LTT 0 or LTT * 0 therefore does not increase the prooftheoretic strength of the system (this will be proven in Section 5.3). This is a rare situation; in general, the inclusion of a universe raises the strength of a type theory considerably (see for example [15] ). We conjecture that, if we closed U under → or Set ( ) in LTT 0 or LTT * 0 , the resulting system would not be conservative over ACA 0 or ACA respectively. 4. In Aczel and Gambino's original formulation of LTTs [4, 5] , the logical component of an LTT could depend on the type theoretic component, but not vice versa. We have broken that restriction with the inclusion of typed sets: a canonical object of Set (A) has the form {x : A | P } and thus depends on a small proposition P .
Embedding Second Order Systems in Logic-Enriched Type Theories
There is a translation that can naturally be defined from the language of second order arithmetic L into LTT 0 . We map the terms of L to terms of type N, first order quantifiers to quantifiers over N, and second order quantifiers to quantifiers over Set (N).
Definition 3.1. We define
• for every term t of L, a term |t| of LTT W ;
• for every arithmetic formula φ of L, a small proposition |φ| of LTT W ;
• for every formula φ of L, a proposition |φ| of LTT W .
It is straightforward to show that this translation is sound, in the following sense:
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 are proven straightforwardly by induction on t and φ.
For part 3, it is sufficient to prove the case where φ is an axiom of ACA 0 . The case of the Peano axioms is straightforward.
For the arithmetical comprehension axiom schema, let φ be an arithmetic formula in which X does not occur free. We have
as required. The set induction axiom is shown to be provable using (Ind N ). For part 4, it is sufficient to show that every instance of the full induction axiom schema is provable in LTT * 0 . This is easy to do using (Ind N ), as |φ| is always an analytic proposition.
Corollary 3.2.1 LTT W is strictly stronger than ACA 0 . In fact, LTT W can prove the consistency of ACA 0 .
Proof. As ACA 0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic [1] , its proof-theoretic ordinal is ǫ 0 . The proof-theoretic ordinal of ACA is ǫ ǫ0 [11, 16] . Therefore, ACA can prove the consistency of ACA 0 ; hence, so can LTT * 0 ; hence, so can LTT W . Our aim in this paper is to prove the converse to Theorem 3.2 parts 3 and 4: that, whenever Γ ⊢⇒ |φ| in LTT 0 or LTT * 0 , then φ is provable in the corresponding subsystem of second order arithmetic.
Conservativity of T 2 over ACA 0
We shall now define the system T 2 , which is a subsystem of LTT 0 . We can think of T 2 as the second order fragment of LTT 0 ; that is, the part of LTT 0 that has just the two types N and Set (N).
The translation | | given in the previous section is in fact a sound translation of ACA 0 into T 2 . In this section, we shall prove that this translation is conservative; that is, if |φ| is provable in T 2 , then φ is a theorem of ACA 0 .
The syntax of T 2 is given by the following grammar The rules of deduction of T 2 are:
1. the structural rules for LTTs as given in Appendix Appendix A.1.1; 2. the rules for predicate logic as given in Appendix Appendix A.1.7; 3. the rules for the propositional universe as given in Appendix Appendix A.1.8, with the rules for universal quantification replaced with the rules in Figure  1 ; 4. the rules for equality given in Appendix Appendix A.1.9, restricted to the type N; 5. the rules for sets given in Appendix Appendix A.1.5, restricted to the type N; 6. the rules for natural numbers given in Figure 2 .
Note. T 2 does not contain the universe U . The symbolN therefore is not a term in T 2 , and cannot occur on its own, but only as part of a small proposition ∀ x :N.P .
In LTT 0 , we could define functions by recursion into any small type; in T 2 , we can only define by recursion functions from N to N. This is achieved by the constructor R. The term R(L, [x, y]M, N ) is intended to denote the value f (N ), where f : N → N is defined by recursion thus:
The system T 2 may be considered a subsystem of
The translation given in Section 3.3 is a sound translation from ACA 0 into T 2 .
Theorem 4.1 Let Γ and φ be as in Theorem 3.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2(3).
We now wish to show that the converse holds.
We shall do this by defining the following translation Φ from T 2 to ACA 0 . Let
We shall define:
1. whenever Γ ⊢ M : N, an arithmetic formula t = M such that
The intention is that M is interpreted as the unique number x for which x = M is true. 2. whenever Γ ⊢ M : Set (N), an arithmetic formula t ∈ M such that
The intention is that M is interpreted as the unique set X whose members are the numbers x such that x ∈ M is true. 3. for every small proposition P such that Γ ⊢ P prop, an arithmetic formula P . 4. for every proposition φ such that Γ ⊢ φ Prop, a formula φ .
The definition is given in Figure 3 . Remark. To interpret a term of the form R(L, [u, v] M, N ), we make use of a standard technique for defining functions by recursion in ACA 0 . We are assuming we have defined in ACA 0 a pairing function (m, n) on the natural numbers, and a coding of finite sequences of numbers as numbers, with Seq the set of all codes of sequences, and the formula n ∈ s expressing that n is a member of the sequence coded by s. (For more details, see [1, II.3] .) Speaking informally, the formula t = R(L, [u, v] M, N ) expresses that (N, t) is a member of a sequence s, and that the members of this sequence s must be
The following theorem shows that the translation in Figure 3 is sound.
Proof. We need the following two results first.
For any term
This is proven by induction on M . 2. Given a term N such that x / ∈ FV (N ), the following are all theorems of ACA 0 :
These are proven by induction on M , P or φ. Formulas (3)-(6) must be proven simultaneously.
The seven parts of the theorem are now proven simultaneously by induction on derivations. We deal with one case here: the rule
We reason in ACA 0 . By the induction hypothesis, there exist l and n such that l = L , n = N . Further,
The following formula can be proven by induction on z:
Now, let n be the unique number such that n = N . There exist m, p such that (n, m) and (Sn, p) are members of such a sequence s. It follows that
Hence, by (2), we have
as required.
Conservativity shall follow from the following theorem, which states that the mapping is a left-inverse to the mapping | | from ACA 0 to T 2 , up to logical equivalence. Proof. The proof of each of these statements is a straightforward induction. We deal with one case here: the case t ≡ t 1 + t 2 . We reason in ACA 0 . The induction hypothesis gives
and we must show t 1 + t 2 = |t 1 | plus |t 2 | , i.e.
∃n.∃r ∈ Seq(n = |t 2 | ∧ (n,
We prove the following by induction on b:
The desired proposition follows by instantiating a with t 1 and b with t 2 . In this section, we shall prove that LTT 0 is conservative over T 2 . This shall complete the proof that LTT 0 is conservative over ACA 0 .
We shall do this by defining a number of subsystems of LTT 0 as shown in the diagram:
For each of these inclusions A ֒→ B, we shall prove that A is a conservative subsystem of B; that is, for every judgement J in the language of A, if J is derivable in B then J is derivable in A. This shall sometimes involve constructing yet more subsystems in between A and B, and proving that all these inclusions are conservative. Intuitively, each subsystem deals with a subset of the types of LTT 0 .
• T 2 has only two types, N and Set (N).
• The types of T ω are all the types that can be built up from N using ×, → and Set ().
• The types of T ω U are the types of T ω , together with the universe U . (The constructors ×, → and Set () may not be applied to U in T ω U .)
The formal definitions of these systems shall be given in the sections to come.
Digression -Informal Explanation of Proof Technique
Before proceeding with the technical details of the proof, we shall explain the informal ideas behind the technique we use to prove LTT 0 conservative over T 2 . The system LTT 0 is formed from T 2 by adding products, function types, types of sets, and the universe U . Intuitively, none of these should increase the power of the system.
We can see this most clearly in the case of products. Speaking generally, let S be any type system, and let T be formed by adding product types to S. Then T should have no more expressive power than S, because we can envisage a translation from T to S:
• wherever a variable z : A × B occurs, replace it with two variables x : A, y : B;
• wherever a term of type A × B occurs, replace it with two terms, one of type A and one of type B.
As long as the only way of introducing terms of type A × B is the constructor ( , ), we should always be able to find the two S-terms of types A and B that correspond to any T -term of type A × B. (This would however not be possible if (say) we could eliminate N over A × B in T .) In brief:
• the terms of type A × B can be interpreted as pairs M, N where M : A and N : B.
Similarly,
• the terms of type A → B can be interpreted as pairs x, M where x : A ⊢ M : B;
• the terms of type Set (A) can be interpreted as pairs x, P where x : A ⊢ P prop.
Our proof relies on making these intuitive ideas formal. These ideas show us how we might be able to remove types A → B that involve only one use of the arrow, but they do not show us how to handle types of the form (A → B) → C. Let us take another example: let S be a typing system without function types, and let T be formed from S by adding function types. Let us define the depth of a type A, d(A) by:
• the depth of each type in S is 0;
Then we have seen how to interpret types of depth 1 in terms of types of depth 0. More generally, we can interpret types of depth n + 1 in terms of types of depth n.
This shows us how to complete the proof. We introduce an infinite sequence of subsystems of T :
where, in A n , only types of depth ≤ n may occur. We build an interpretation of A n+1 out of the terms of A n : every type of A n is interpreted as itself; the types A → B of depth n + 1 are interpreted as the set of pairs x, M where
Using these interpretations, we can prove each A n+1 conservative over A n , and hence T conservative over S. With these intuitive ideas to guide us, we return to the proof development.
T ω is Conservative over T 2
We shall now define the system T ω to be T 2 extended with pairs, functions and sets over all types, and prove that T ω is conservative over T 2 .
Definition 5.1 (T ω ). The LTT T ω is defined as follows.
The grammar of T ω is the grammar of T 2 extended with
The rules of deduction of T ω are the rules of deduction of T 2 , together with the rules for pairs (Appendix Appendix A.1.3), function types (Appendix Appendix A.1.4) and typed sets (Appendix Appendix A.1.5).
Note that the type-theory component T ω is non-dependent: a term can never occur in a type. As a consequence, we have
Proof. Induction on derivations.
To prove that T ω is conservative over T 2 , we shall define an infinite sequence of subsystems of T ω , and prove that each is conservative over the previous subsystem, and that the smallest is conservative over T 2 .
We define the depth of a type of T ω as follows. 
Note that the types of T 2 are exactly the types of depth 0. For n ≥ 1, we shall define A n to be the fragment of T ω that deals only with types of depth ≤ n.
Definition 5.4 (A n ).
Let n ≥ 0. By a type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of A n , we mean a type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of T ω that does not contain, as a subexpression, any type of depth > n.
We say a judgement J of A n is derivable in A n iff there exists a derivation of J in T ω consisting solely of judgements of A n ; that is, a derivation of J in which no type of depth > n occurs. We write Γ ⊢ n J iff the judgement Γ ⊢ J is derivable in A n .
Note that the types of A n are exactly the types of depth ≤ n. Note also that A 0 is just the system T 2 .
We shall prove that A n+1 is conservative over A n . The proof shall involve defining an interpretation of A n+1 in terms of the expressions of A n . For the rest of this section, fix n ≥ 0, and fix a context ∆ of A n such that ∆ ⊢ n valid.
Definition 5.5 (Interpretation of Types).
For the purposes of this definition, an 'object' is either a term of A n , or a pair of terms of A n .
For every type A of A n+1 , we define the set of objects [[A]] ∆ , and an equivalence relation ∼ A ∆ on this set, as follows.
We identify the elements of [[A → B]] ∆ and [[Set (A)]]
∆ up to α-conversion; that is, we identify x, M with y, [y/x]M if y is not free in M . We define the operations Π 1 , Π 2 and @ on these objects as follows.
Π 1 (X) and Π 2 (X) are undefined if X is not a pair. X@Y is undefined if X does not have the form x, Z , or if Y is not a term.
The intention is that we will interpret the terms of type A as members of the set (|x|)
Note that this is a partial definition; (|M |) v A will sometimes be undefined.
Definition 5.8 (Interpretation of Small Propositions). If P is a small
A n+1 -proposition, we define the small proposition (|P |)
Definition 5.9 (Depth of a Proposition). We define the depth of a proposition φ, d(φ), to be d(φ) = 0 if φ is quantifier-free max{d(A) | φ contains a quantifier ∀x : A} otherwise Definition 5.10 (Interpretation of Propositions). If φ is an A n+1 -proposition of depth ≤ n, we define the A n -proposition (|φ|) v as follows
We have defined a sound interpretation of all the judgement forms of A n+1 except one: the judgement form Γ ⊢ Φ ⇒ φ. To interpret these judgements, we shall define a notion of satisfaction. Intuitively, we define what it is for a proposition φ of A n+1 to be 'true' under a context ∆, valuation v and sequence of propositions Φ of A n . If
•
Definition 5.12 (Satisfaction and Truth). Let Γ ⊢ J be a judgement of A n+1 , and let v be a ∆-valuation of Γ. We define what it means for ∆ and v to satisfy J , written (∆, v) |= J , as follows:
• (∆, v) |= φ = ψ iff for all Φ, (∆, Φ, v) |= φ ⇔ (∆, Φ, v) |= ψ.
• For all other judgement bodies J , we have (∆, v) |= J for all ∆, v.
We say a judgement Γ ⊢ J of A n+1 is true iff, for every context ∆ of A n such that ∆ ⊢ n valid and every ∆-valuation v of Γ, (∆, v) |= J .
The following theorem shows that this interpretation is sound.
Theorem 5.13 (Soundness) Every derivable judgement of A n+1 is true.
The proof is given in Appendix Appendix B.1.
Theorem 5.14 (Completeness)
1. Let Γ ⊢ J be a judgement of A n , and suppose J does not have the form Φ ⇒ ψ. If the judgement is true, and Γ ⊢ n valid, then the judgement is derivable in A n . 2. Let Γ ⊢ φ 1 , . . . , φ m ⇒ ψ be a judgement of A n . If the judgement is true, and we have Γ ⊢ n valid and Γ ⊢ n φ i Prop for i = 1, . . . , m, then the judgement is derivable in A n .
Proof. Corollary 5.14.1 If J is a judgement of A n derivable in A n+1 , then J is derivable in A n .
Proof. This follows almost immediately from the Soundness Theorem and the Completeness Theorem. There are just two facts that need to be verified:
1. If Γ is a context of A n , and Γ ⊢ n+1 J , then Γ ⊢ n valid. 2. If Γ is a context of A n ; φ 1 , . . . , φ m are propositions of A n ; and Γ ⊢ n+1 φ 1 , . . . , φ m ⇒ ψ; then Γ ⊢ n valid and Γ ⊢ n φ i Prop.
These are proven fairly easily by induction on derivations, using the Soundness and Completeness Theorems.
Corollary 5.14.2 (Conservativity of T ω over T 2 ) If J is a judgement of T 2 , and J is derivable in T ω , then J is derivable in T 2 .
Proof. Suppose J is derivable in T ω . Let n be the largest depth of type or proposition that occurs in the derivation. Then J is derivable in A n . Applying Corollary 5.14.1, we have that J is derivable in A n−1 , A n−2 , . . . , A 0 . But derivability in A 0 is the same as derivability in T 2 .
T ω U is Conservative over T ω
The system T ω U is the fragment of LTT 0 that includes all the types of T ω , and the universe U , but does not include types such as U × U , N → U , or Set (U ). It is defined in a similar manner to the systems A n of the previous section, but using a new notion of depth.
Definition 5.15 (T ω U ).
A type A of LTT 0 is a type of T ω U , iff either A ≡ U or the symbol U does not occur in A.
By a term (small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of T ω U , we mean a term (small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of LTT 0 in which every type that occurs as a subexpression is a type of T ω U
We say a judgement J of T ω U is derivable in T ω U iff there exists a derivation of J in LTT 0 consisting solely of judgements of T ω U ; that is, a derivation of J in which every type that occurs is a type of T ω U .
We write Γ ⊢ + J iff the judgement Γ ⊢ J is derivable in T ω U , and Γ ⊢ − J iff the judgement Γ ⊢ J is derivable in T ω .
Note. The types of T ω U are not closed under ×, → or Set ( ). For example, the types U × U and U → U are not types of T ω U .
In order to prove T ω U conservative over T ω , we must find an interpretation of U and of the types T (M ). We do this by interpreting the objects of T (M ) as binary trees with leaves labelled by natural numbers. For example, the object ((1, 2), 3) of type T ((N×N)×N) will be interpreted as the binary tree
We interpret U as the set of all shapes of binary tree. We begin by inventing a syntax for the set of all shapes of binary trees:
Definition 5.16 (Shape). The set of shapes is defined inductively by:
• • is a shape.
• If S and T are shapes, so is S ∧ T .
We write S for the set of all shapes.
The example tree above has shape (• ∧ •) ∧ •. We must thus associate each shape with a small type. This association is done formally by the following function:
Definition 5.17. For every shape S ∈ S , define the type T (S) of T ω as follows:
There are two other gaps between T ω U and T ω to be bridged. In T ω , we can only eliminate N over N; in T ω U , we can eliminate over any small type. Likewise, in T ω , a small proposition may only involve quantification over N; in T ω U , a small proposition may involve quantification over any small type.
We bridge these gaps by using the fact that every binary tree can be coded as a natural number. Given a bijection P : N 2 → N, we can assign a code number to every binary tree. The binary tree above, for example, would be assigned the code number P (P (1, 2), 3) . We shall define, for every shape S, mutually inverse functions
Using these functions, we can interpret recursion over small types by recursion over N, and quantification over small types by quantification over N.
We turn now to the formal details. The first step is to construct in T ω the bijection P above, and the coding and decoding functions.
Lemma 5.18 (Pairing Function) There exist T ω -terms
such that the following are theorems of T ω :
Proof. Consider the three primitive recursive functions
It is straightforward to define terms P, Q 1 and Q 2 in T ω that express p, q and r and prove the three formulas (9) .
Fix three such terms P, Q 1 and Q 2 for the sequel.
We shall also need a notion of equality on every small type in T ω , not just N. This is defined as follows.
Definition 5.19. Given T ω -terms M and N and a T ω -type A, define the T ω -proposition M = A N as follows. 
Lemma 5.21 For every shape S, the following are theorems of T ω :
Proof. The proof is by induction on S, using the properties of P, Q 1 and Q 2 from Lemma 5.18.
We can now proceed to define our interpretation of T ω U in terms of T ω . The definition is more complex than the interpretation in the previous section, because the type-theoretic component of T ω U is dependent, so we must define our interpretations of terms and types simultaneously. Definition 5.22. Let ∆ be a context of T ω , and v a function. We define the following simultaneously.
• Given a T ω U -term M and a function v, define the object (|M |) v as follows.
where
• Given a type
• Given a small proposition P of T ω U , define a small proposition (|P |) v of T ω as follows.
• Given a proposition φ of T ω U that does not include a quantifier over U , define a proposition (|φ|) v of T ω as follows.
Recall that we write ∆ ⊢ − J iff ∆ ⊢ J is derivable in T ω . If φ does not involve quantification over U , then
Otherwise,
Definition 5.24 (Satisfaction and Truth). Let Γ ⊢ J be a judgement of T ω U . Let ∆ ⊢ − valid, and let v be a ∆-valuation of Γ. We define what it means for ∆ and v to satisfy J , (∆, v) |= J , as follows.
v is defined.
• If φ does not include a quantifier over U , then (∆, v) |= φ Prop iff ∆ ⊢ − (|φ|) Prop.
• For all other judgement forms, we have (∆, v) |= J for all ∆, v.
We say a judgement Γ ⊢ J of T ω U is true iff, for all ∆ such that ∆ ⊢ − valid and all ∆-valuations v of Γ, (∆, v) |= J .
Remark. This interpretation uses the propositional equality defined in Definition 5.19, whereas our interpretation in the previous section used judgemental equality. This is because the properties of our coding and decoding functions can be shown to hold up to propositional equality (as in Lemma 5.21), but not up to judgemental equality.
We now prove that the interpretation is sound.
Theorem 5.25 (Soundness) Every derivable judgement in T ω U is true.
The proof is given in Appendix Appendix B.2.
Theorem 5.26 (Completeness) If Γ ⊢ J is a judgement of T ω that is true, and Γ ⊢ − valid, then Γ ⊢ J is derivable in T ω .
Proof. Exactly as in Theorem 5.14.
Proof. Similar to Corollary 5.14.1.
5.4.
LTT 0 is Conservative over T ω U The next step in our proof is to apply the same method to show that LTT 0 is conservative over T ω U . The proof is very similar to Section 5.2, but the details are more complicated, because we are now dealing with LTTs whose type theoretic components use dependent types.
Once again, we introduce an infinite sequence of subsystems between T ω U and LTT 0 :
We do this using a new definition of the depth of a type: 
We define the depth of a proposition φ, D(φ), to be the largest depth of a type A such that the quantifier ∀x : A occurs in φ, or D(φ) = 0 if φ is quantifier-free.
Note that the types of T ω U are exactly the types A such that D(A) ≤ 1. The subsystems B n are defined as follows.
Definition 5.28 (B n ). Let n ≥ 0. By a type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of B n , we mean a type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of LTT 0 that does not contain, as a subexpression, any type A such that D(A) > n. We say a judgement J of B n is derivable in B n iff there exists a derivation of J in LTT 0 consisting solely of judgements of B n ; that is, a derivation of J in which no type A occurs such that D(A) > n. In this section, we write Γ ⊢ n J iff the judgement Γ ⊢ J is derivable in B n .
We define an interpretation of B n+1 in terms of B n : Definition 5.29. Fix n ≥ 1. Let ∆ be a context of B n , and v a function. We define the following simultaneously.
• Given a term M of B n+1 , define the object (|B|) v .
(|x|)
• Given a small proposition P of B n+1 , define the small proposition (|P |) v as follows.
• Given a proposition φ of B n+1 such that D(φ) ≤ n, define the proposition (|φ|) v as follows.
We define what the notion of satisfaction (∆, Φ, v) |= ψ similarly to Definition 5.11: If
• •
• (∆, v) |= φ = ψ iff, for all Φ, we have (∆, Φ, v) |= φ iff (∆, Φ, v) |= ψ.
• For any other J , we have (∆, v) |= J for all ∆, v.
We say Γ ⊢ J is true iff, whenever ∆ ⊢ n valid and v is a ∆-valuation of Γ, then (∆, v) |= J .
Theorem 5.32 (Soundness) Every derivable judgement in B n+1 is true.
Proof. Similar to Theorems 5.13 and 5.25.
Theorem 5.33
1. Let Γ ⊢ J be a judgement of B n , and suppose J does not have the form Φ ⇒ ψ. If the judgement is true, and Γ ⊢ n valid, then the judgement is derivable in B n . 2. Let Γ ⊢ φ 1 , . . . , φ m ⇒ ψ be a judgement of B n . If the judgement is true, and we have Γ ⊢ n valid and Γ ⊢ n φ i Prop for i = 1, . . . , m, then the judgement is derivable in B n .
Proof. Similar to Theorem 5.14.
With this final step, we have now completed the proof of the conservativity of LTT 0 over ACA 0 :
Corollary 5.33.3 Let φ be a formula of second order arithmetic with free variables x 1 , . . . , x m , X 1 , . . . , X n . If 6. Other Conservativity Results
Conservativity of LTT *
0 over ACA Our proof method can be adapted quite straightforwardly to prove the conservativity of LTT * 0 over ACA. We shall present these proofs briefly, giving only the details that need to be changed.
We define subsystems of LTT * 0 :
T * 2 is formed from T 2 by allowing the rule (Ind N ) to be applied with any analytic proposition φ. In the same manner, T * ω is formed from T ω , T ω U * is formed from T ω U , and LTT * 0 is formed from LTT 0 . The proof of the conservativity of LTT * 0 over T * 2 follows exactly the same pattern as in Section 5. 6.2. Conservativity of ACA 0 over PA As a side-benefit of this work, we can easily produce as a corollary another proof that ACA 0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic (PA). We can define a system T 1 with just one type, N, in its type-theoretic component. We can apply our method to show that T 2 is conservative over T 1 , and that T 1 is conservative over PA; we omit the details.
Combining all these proofs, we can produce the following elementary proof that ACA 0 is conservative over PA, which proceeds by interpreting the formulas of ACA 0 as statements about PA. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this proof has not appeared in print before.
Theorem 6.2 ACA 0 is conservative over PA.
Proof. Define a PA-formula to be a formula in which no set variables (bound or free) occur.
Let V be a set of variables of L. A valuation of V is a function v on V such that:
• for every number variable x ∈ V, v(x) is a term of PA;
• for every set variable X ∈ V, v(X) is an expression of the form {y | φ} where φ is a PA-formula.
For t a term, let v(t) be the result of substituting v(x) for each variable x in t.
For φ a formula of L, let v(φ) be the PA-formula that results from making the following replacements throughout φ.
• Replace each atomic formula s = t with v(s) = v(t).
• For each atomic formula t ∈ X, let v(X) = {y | ψ}.
Define what it is for a valuation v and PA-formula ψ to satisfy an L-formula φ, (v, ψ) |= φ, as follows.
• If φ is arithmetic, (v, ψ) |= φ iff ψ ⊃ v(φ) is a theorem of PA. Otherwise:
• (v, ψ) |= ∀xφ iff, for every term t, (v[x := t], ψ) |= φ.
• (v, ψ) |= ∀Xφ iff, for every PA-formula χ, (v[X := {y | χ}], ψ) |= φ.
Let us say that a formula φ of L is true iff (v, x = x) |= φ for every valuation v. We prove the following two claims:
1. Every theorem of ACA 0 is true. 2. Every PA-formula that is true is a theorem of PA.
The first claim is proven by induction on derivations in ACA 0 . As an example, consider the axiom
where X / ∈ FV (φ). Fix v and χ, and suppose
We must show that (v, χ) |= φ ⊃ ∀Xψ. Let χ ′ be any PA-formula, and suppose (v, χ ∧ χ ′ ) |= φ. Let τ be any PAformula; we must show that (v[X :
The second claim is proven using the valuation that is the identity on FV (φ). It follows that, if a formula of PA is a theorem of ACA 0 , then it is a theorem of PA.
Remarks.
1. The same method could be used to show that Gödel-Bernays set theory is conservative over ZF set theory. 2. Another proof-theoretic method of proving this results is given in Shoenfield [10] . That proof relies on some quite strong results about classical theories; our proof is more elementary. However, Shoenfield's proof is constructive (giving an algorithm that would produce a proof of ⊥ in PA from a proof of ⊥ in ACA 0 ) and can be formalised in PRA; ours has neither of these properties.
An argument has been made that the system ACA + 0 corresponds to Weyl's foundation [9, p.135] , claiming that its axiom schema of ω-iterated arithmetical comprehension 'occurs in the formal systems defined by Weyl and Zahn', presumably a reference to Weyl's Principle of Iteration [13, p.38] .
The axioms of ACA + 0 are the axioms of ACA 0 together with the following axiom schema of ω-iterated arithmetical comprehension. Assume we have defined a pairing function (x, y) in ACA 0 . We put
Then, for every arithmetical formula φ[n, Y ] in which X does not occur free, the following is an axiom:
The translation we gave in Section 3.3 is a sound translation from ACA + 0 into LTT W . It is difficult to construct a subsystem of LTT W that is conservative over ACA + 0 , however. A natural suggestion would be to extend LTT 0 by allowing E N to take either a small type, or the type Set (N); let us call the system produced LTT 
and appropriate equality rules. However, it seems unlikely that T + 2 is conservative over ACA + 0 . In particular, there seems to be no way to interpret terms that involve two or more applications of R + . In LTT + 0 , we may iterate any definable function Set (N) → Set (N). In ACA + 0 , we may only iterate those functions that are defined by an arithmetic proposition; and not every such function definable in ACA + 0 is defined by an arithmetic proposition.
Conclusion
We have constructed two subsystems of LTT W , and proved that these are conservative over ACA 0 and ACA respectively. We have thus shown how, using LTTs, we can take a system like ACA 0 or ACA and add to it the ability to speak of pairs, functions of all orders, sets of all orders, and a universe of types, without increasing the proof-theoretic strength of the system.
We have also begun the proof-theoretic analysis of LTT W . We now know that LTT W is strictly stronger than LTT 0 , and hence ACA 0 . The subsystem LTT * 0 is quite a small fragment of LTT W , and so we conjecture that LTT W is strictly stronger than LTT * 0 , and hence strictly stronger than ACA. Once this conjecture is proven, we will have quite strong evidence for our claim that Weyl's foundation exceeds both ACA 0 and ACA.
The method of proof we have given is quite a general one, and should be applicable in many other situations. It does not rely on any reduction properties of the type system, and so could be applied to type systems that are not strongly normalising, or do not satisfy Church-Rosser (or are not known to be strongly normalising or to satisfy Church-Rosser). It provides a uniform method for proving types redundant; we were able to remove products, function types, types of sets, and the universe from LTT 0 .
Furthermore, the method allowed us to separate these tasks. We were able to remove U separately from the other types, and to use a different interpretation to do so. In Sections 5.2 and 5.4, for example, we interpreted judgemental equality by judgemental equality; in Section 5.3, we interpreted judgemental equality by propositional equality. Our method is thus quite powerful; we did not have to find a single interpretation that would perform all these tasks.
A proof of our conjecture that LTT W is stronger than LTT * 0 has very recently been discovered, by the first author and Anton Setzer. The proof theoretic strength of LTT W is in fact φ ǫ0 (0). A paper presenting the proof of this result is in preparation.
For future work, we should investigate more generally how adding features to an LTT changes its proof-theoretic strength. This will be a more difficult task, as we will need to investigate what effect induction and recursion have when they are no longer confined to the small types and propositions. We are particularly interested in the differences between LTTs and systems of predicate logic; for example, in how the strength of an LTT changes when we modify the type-theoretic component but not the logical component.
Finally, we note that there are striking superficial similarities between our work and Streicher [17] , who also gave interpretations to type theories. Like our interpretations, his were first defined as partial functions on the syntax, then proven to be total on the typable terms by induction on derivations. He also made use of a 'depth' function on types. Our work is not a direct application of his, but it remains to be seen whether there are formal connections that can be exploited. Appendix A.1.9. Equality
Appendix A.1.
Differences from Previous Presentation
The above presentation differs from the one in [6] in a few respects. In that paper, we constructed LTT W within the logical framework LF ′ . Here, we have presented LTT W as a separate, stand-alone formal system. The constant Peirce in [6] has been replaced with the rule (DN), the constant I ⇒ has been replaced with the rule (eta → ), and the constant I × has been replaced with (eta × ).
It is not difficult to show that the two presentations are equivalent. These changes have been made in order to simplify the definition of the interpretations in Section 5.
In [6] , we introduced a proposition 'prop', and used the proofs of 'prop' as the names of the small propositions. We also discussed the possibility of making 'prop' a type. In this paper, we have taken a neutral option: we have used a separate judgement form Γ ⊢ P prop. The system we present here can be embedded in both the system that has 'prop' a proposition, and the system that has 'prop' a type. It can be shown that these two embeddings are conservative.
